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Note 
“Liberty and Justice for All”: Equalizing Pretrial 
Detention for Wealthy and Indigent Defendants 
CAIT BARRETT 
Pretrial detention is affected by many factors. One of those is wealth. While the 
ability to post bail is a major issue in state systems, the federal system poses a 
different problem: the ability to pay for mitigating conditions. This has the potential 
to create a disparate impact between wealthy defendants—who can afford 
conditions that mitigate findings of flight or danger—and indigent defendants who 
cannot. There are two solutions: detaining wealthy defendants to avoid disparate 
release or releasing indigent defendants to avoid disparate detention. This Note 
argues for the latter. It does so by focusing on the requirement for courts under the 
Bail Reform Act to release defendants with the “least restrictive” conditions. A 
framework for release is created by reading “least restrictive” through various 
lenses. First, reading “least restrictive” through a purposeful lens allows it to 
become quite expansive, such that almost any set of conditions, as long as they 
mitigate the necessary findings, allow for release. Second, a practical approach 
allows “least restrictive” to be read in the context of the Bail Reform Act’s language 
and mandate to argue for a broad range of conditions. Third, “least restrictive,” 
read in light of societal considerations, including who bears the burden of detention, 
opens up more pathways for release and demonstrates the importance of leveling 
up release instead of leveling down detention. The overall goal of this Note is to 
provide various analyses to help inform bail decisionmakers’ considerations and to 
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“Liberty and Justice for All”: Equalizing Pretrial 
Detention for Wealthy and Indigent Defendants 
CAIT BARRETT * 
INTRODUCTION 
Pretrial detention is becoming an increasing focus in scholarship across 
the United States. As prison reform and mass incarceration dialogues carry 
on, pretrial detention and bail reform play an important role, in part because 
“[p]retrial detainees make up more than 70 percent of the U.S. jail 
population – approximately 536,000 people,”1 and 75% of federal 
defendants in prison are pretrial detainees, costing the federal government 
$1.5 billion per year.2 Pretrial bail reform exemplifies the need for fairness 
and equity in the criminal justice system as individuals are detained without 
a conviction. In that vein, a large part of the current scholarship focuses on 
the racial and wealth disparities present at the state-level through the practice 
of money bail.3 Modern pretrial scholarship also focuses on the fairness and 
 
* J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law; B.A., Johns Hopkins University. I would like to 
thank Professor Jamelia Morgan for advising me throughout this process; this Note would not have gone 
far without her calmness and wisdom. I would also like to thank Professor Steven Wilf for his substantive 
guidance on my argument and for graciously plying me with books. A special thank you to the Honorable 
Robert A. Richardson and John Fries for giving me the job and experience that inspired this Note, both 
of whom have been so supportive throughout my law school career. I would also like to thank my friends 
for supporting me during this writing process, including reading drafts. A final thank you to my parents 
and brother for giving me the opportunity and encouragement to pursue all of my passions.  
1 Adureh Onyekwere, How Cash Bail Works, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Dec. 10, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/how-cash-bail-works. 
2 Matthew G. Rowland, The Rising Federal Pretrial Detention Rate, in Context, 82 FED. PROB. 13, 
13 (2018). 
3 See LINDSEY DEVERS, BAIL DECISIONMAKING: RESEARCH SUMMARY, BUREAU OF JUST. 
ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST. 2–3 (2011), https://bja.ojp.gov/sites/g/files/xyckuh186/files/media/ 
document/BailDecisionmakingResearchSummary.pdf (citations omitted) (“[T]he true source of bias in 
bail decisions might be financial rather than demographic. Although income and social disadvantage 
have correlated with pretrial release, many of the characteristics overlap with those stereotypes associated 
with race and ethnicity. Minority populations share many of the same social problems, such as poverty, 
unemployment, greater numbers of single heads of household, lower levels of education, and increased 
opportunity to commit crime. . . . It has also been found that bail decisionmakers are less likely to give 
black suspects the same ‘benefit of the doubt’ they give white suspects. Black defendants are less likely 
to be released from pretrial detention than are white defendants. . . . Hispanics are more likely to be 
detained than are both white and black suspects.”). See also Application for Leave to File Brief Amici 
Curiae and Proposed Brief of Amici Curiae National Law Professors of Criminal, Procedural, and 
Constitutional Law in Support of Respondent at 15, In re Humphrey, No. S247278, 2018 WL 5465210 
(Cal. Oct. 18, 2018)  (asking the court to affirm the lower court’s holding that “[w]hen the government 
proposes to incarcerate a person before trial, it must provide thorough justification, whether the 
mechanism of detention is a transparent detention order or its functional equivalent, the imposition of 
unaffordable money bail” (emphasis omitted)). 
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equity of risk assessment of defendants at both the state and federal level.4 
And because pretrial detention is a liminal area, the constitutionality and 
legality of certain practices are oft questioned.5 It is against this backdrop 
that a new6 problem in pretrial detention emerges. 
In August 2019, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit released a written opinion in United States v. Boustani,7 where the 
court explained its affirmance of an order of detention for a wealthy 
defendant issued in May 2019. At the center of the court’s analysis was its 
desire to prevent a “two-tiered bail system,”8 where wealthy defendants are 
released because they can afford conditions that mitigate findings of flight 
risk and danger to the community, while indigent defendants who cannot 
afford the same conditions are detained. 
The idea of allowing wealthy defendants to escape to a gilded cage while 
indigent defendants, releasable but for their wealth, are sent to detention 
centers, potentially in another state from where they reside and are being 
charged, seems fundamentally unfair. But the Bail Reform Act mandates 
release when conditions mitigate any findings of flight risk or danger to the 
community. To read it any other way would be to ignore the statute’s clear 
directive. So, how can the Bail Reform Act, in light of this requirement, be 
read to equalize release between wealthy and indigent defendants?  
This Note seeks to answer that question. This Note will discuss the 
gravity of pretrial detention and the effects on individuals, particularly in 
 
4 See Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 502–03 
(2012) (proposing a model for release focusing on the release “of older defendants, defendants with clean 
records, and defendants charged with fraud and public-order offenses” based on an empirical study of 
factors considered by judges in determining the risk of violent re-offense during release); Kristin Bechtel, 
Alexander M. Holsinger, Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Madeline J. Warren, A Meta-Analytic Review of 
Pretrial Research: Risk Assessment, Bond Type, and Interventions, 42 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 443, 446 
(2017) (“Due to financial and resource constraints, the majority of jurisdictions still do not have an 
objective and standardized pretrial risk assessment instrument available to inform the release decision. 
Nonetheless, the objective use of actuarial risk assessments at any stage of justice decision making 
constitutes a ‘best practice,’ and there may be consequences for not developing or adopting a pretrial risk 
tool.”); Sandra G. Mayson, Dangerous Defendants, 127 YALE L.J. 490, 518–20 (2018) (challenging the 
assumption that defendants are inherently more dangerous than non-defendant individuals and how that 
affects the imposition of conditions and detention); Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 
2218, 2226 (2019) (demonstrating that “disparities in classification will translate in disparities in 
outcomes” when utilizing algorithmic risk assessment tools); see generally Ngozi Okidegbe, The 
Democratizing Potential of Algorithms?, 53 CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021) (discussing how pretrial 
risk assessment algorithms are racially exclusive). 
5 For just one of many examples of this liminality, see Angelina N. McDonald, In Search of a 
Standard of Review: Decisions to Forcibly Medicate Pre-Trial Detainees in Light of Riggins v. Nevada, 
72 U. CIN. L. REV. 285, 286, 295–96 (2003) (noting that Riggins, a case where a defendant was ordered 
to continue Mellaril—an antipsychotic drug—during trial involuntarily, “does not provide a standard by 
which to review the forced medication of pre-trial detainees, particularly those that have not been proven 
a danger to themselves or others, and that the decision to forcibly medicate both dangerous and 
non-dangerous pre-trial detainees should be reviewed under strict scrutiny”).  
6 New in the sense that the same problems discussed above are framed in a different light, raising 
novel concerns and arguments about old issues. 
7 932 F.3d 79 (Boustani II) (2d Cir. 2019). 
8 Id. at 82. 
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light of the presumption of innocence. Using this backdrop, this Note will 
argue that detaining wealthy individuals who can afford certain conditions 
to avoid disparate treatment is actually a detriment to indigent defendants. 
By leveling down, more defendants are detained in contravention of the 
original purpose of the Bail Reform Act. Instead, this Note will explore the 
language of the Bail Reform Act to argue for a level up to allow more 
individuals to be released, regardless of wealth. One way in which this Note 
will engage with the idea of release and detention is by using Jeffrey 
Epstein’s detention as a case study.9 His case exemplifies the tension within 
the Boustani II opinion10 and serves as a starting point for what this change 
in bail reform could look like.11  
In order to do so, this Note will utilize language within the Bail Reform 
Act to argue for an expansion of release. This Note will explore several 
interpretations of the term “least restrictive” in § 3142(c)(1)(B) of the Bail 
Reform Act. These different approaches all lead to the same result: utilizing 
the flexibility of the term in order to strike back at the inequity within the 
pretrial justice system. First, this Note will read “least restrictive” together 
with the purpose of the Bail Reform Act to argue for release of both wealthy 
and indigent defendants.12 Next, this Note will argue for a practical reading 
of the term “least restrictive,” especially in the age of “e-carceration.”13 
Finally, this Note will look at “least restrictive” in a larger societal context 
and with emphasis on the important role that federal bail reform plays in the 
criminal justice system.  
These arguments create a return to the presumption of release embedded 
within the Bail Reform Act. There are nearly 500,000 pretrial individuals in 
 
9 There are, of course, defendants similar to Epstein who have been released. A recent notable case 
is Fotis Dulos, a real estate developer in Connecticut arrested and charged with capital murder, murder, 
and kidnapping. He was released on a $6 million bond. He then committed suicide, stating in his suicide 
note that he refused to spend another minute in jail despite being innocent. Dulos’s case is an important 
foil to Epstein’s. Juxtaposing these cases highlights that a defendant’s release or detention does not 
always ensure a trial, or justice. This serves as an important reminder that pretrial detention is not a 
component of getting justice; it reminds us that pretrial detention is administrative and does not always 
do what it is designed to do: ensure appearance at trial and minimize harm to the community. For more 
information on the Fotis Dulos case, see Emily Shapiro & Aaron Katersky, Fotis Dulos Arrested for 
Murder of Estranged Wife Jennifer Dulos, ABC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:36 PM), https://abcnews.go.co
m/US/fotis-dulos-arrested-murder-case-missing-connecticut-mom/story?id=68116764; Emily Shapiro, 
Fotis Dulos Released on Bond in Jennifer Dulos Murder Case, ABC NEWS (Jan. 9, 2020, 12:56 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/US/fotis-dulos-released-bond-jennifer-dulos-murder-case/story?id=68168186; 
Mola Lenghi, Fotis Dulos Denies Killing Estranged Wife in Suicide Note, CBS NEWS, (Feb. 1, 2020, 
7:36 PM) https://www.cbsnews.com/news/fotis-dulos-news-ct-man-denies-killing-estranged-wife-
jennifer-dulos-in-suicide-note-defends-michelle-troconis/. 
10 It is arguably the entire reason for the Boustani II opinion. See infra pp. 482–85.  
11 This Note is not advocating that Epstein should have been released; rather that the bail conditions 
that he proposed, and their potential mitigating factors, can serve as examples for the future. 
12 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B) (2018).  
13 See infra Part IV.  
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United States jails each day,14 but drafting notes reflect that the Bail Reform 
Act was supposed to decrease the amount of pretrial detainees favoring 
release.15 There is a rebuttable presumption for detention only for “a small 
but identifiable group of particularly dangerous defendants as to whom 
neither the imposition of stringent release conditions nor the prospect of 
revocation of release can reasonably assure the safety of the community or 
other persons.”16 But even this presumption for detention for certain offenses 
“can easily be rebutted.”17 And importantly, at this stage of the criminal trial, 
criminal defendants are still presumed innocent.18 For the presumption of 
innocence to mean anything, there must be a presumption of release, with 
detention only under specific circumstances.19 Without it, there is a risk that 
pretrial detention can morph into a determination of punishment without 
trial.20 This Note reestablishes this presumption for release through a 
reexamination of the Bail Reform Act. 
This Note will not discuss money bail.21 Money bail is mainly utilized 
within the state systems, which are not governed by the Bail Reform Act. In 
the federal system, the Bail Reform Act allows courts to release individuals 
either on personal recognizance, unsecured bonds, or forfeiture bonds, 
 
14 Why We Need Pretrial Reform, PRETRIAL JUST. INST., https://www.pretrial.org/get-
involved/learn-more/why-we-need-pretrial-reform/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2019); see also Onyekwere, 
supra note 1. 
15 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b) (authorizing release on personal recognizance “unless the judicial officer 
determines that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will 
endanger the safety of any other person or the community”) (emphasis added). But see Shima Baradaran, 
Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 752 (2011) (“As intended, the 1984 Bail 
Reform Act was effective in increasing pretrial detention.”) [hereinafter Baradaran, Restoring the 
Presumption of Innocence]. As codified, the Bail Reform Act does not state a clear purpose either for or 
against release. Infra page 251. 
16 S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 6–7 (1983). 
17 James R. Marsh, Reducing Unnecessary Detention: A Goal or Result of Pretrial Services?, 65 
FED. PROB. 16, 16 (2001). This presumption also only applies when a judicial officer finds it applies; it 
is not statutorily required. Id.  
18 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(j) (“Nothing in this section shall be construed as modifying or limiting the 
presumption of innocence.”). 
19 See Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 746–54 (discussing 
the Bail Reform Act’s new concept of release based on community safety and allowance of guilt-based 
determinations).  
20 See id. at 752–54 (explaining how at least one court based its detention determination on a finding 
that the defendant was guilty rather than the risk of his nonappearance or danger to the community).  
21 The Bail Reform Act specifically uses the term “release” to distinguish from money bond. See S. 
REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 16, at 4 (“Instead of using the term ‘bail’, this provision and other provisions 
in this chapter use the term ‘release’ in order to distinguish between money bond (i.e., ‘bail’) and 
conditional release (often referred to as ‘release on bail’).”). And the Bail Reform Act itself expressly 
prevents imposition of “a financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the person.” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(c)(2). Money bail in state systems is a massive problem, leading to painful divisions between 
wealthy and indigent defendants. Just like the federal system, the impact of money bail goes beyond 
affecting the poor; it bleeds into society as a whole. For an in-depth look at the relationship between 
money bail and poverty, one facet of how money bail affects society, see generally BERNADETTE RABUY 
& DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INSTITUTE, DETAINING THE POOR: HOW MONEY BAIL PERPETUATES 
AN ENDLESS CYCLE OF POVERTY AND JAIL TIME (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/Detaini
ngThePoor.pdf.  
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which are only seized upon the individual’s failure to appear, as well as bail 
bonds.22 While money can be a barrier for release at either the state or federal 
level, the Bail Reform Act specifically prohibits money from preventing 
release, unlike the state money bail systems.23 This Note instead focuses on 
other barriers to release involving money that arise in the federal system, 
specifically the ability to pay for certain mitigating conditions, because the 
Bail Reform Act is here to stay.24  
Part I explores Jeffrey Epstein’s bail package and tie decision in United 
States v. Boustani. Part II looks at the current state of the law surrounding 
pretrial detention. Part III briefly looks at the problem of inequity in the 
pretrial system. Part IV, in three subparts, provides the three different lenses, 
purposeful, practical, and societal, for reassessing the Bail Reform Act. The 
last part concludes. 
I.  A TWO-TIERED SYSTEM 
On July 6, 2019, Jeffrey Epstein was arrested and charged with sex 
trafficking.25 His lawyers prepared and argued a bond package, which 
 
22 18 U.S.C. §§ 3142(b), (c)(1)(B)(xi)–(xii). 
23 Id. at § 3141(c)(2) (“The judicial officer may not impose a financial condition that results in the 
pretrial detention of the person.”). See Beth A. Colgan, Wealth-Based Penal Disenfranchisement, 72 
VAND. L. REV. 55, 77–80 (2019) (discussing the effect of parole and probation-based requirements on 
the ability to vote and how wealth factors into systemic disenfranchisement).  
24 In United States v. Salerno, the Supreme Court of the United States upheld the Bail Reform Act 
as constitutional. 481 U.S. 739 (1987). The Court, through Chief Justice Rehnquist, rejected Anthony 
Salerno’s argument that preventative detention was unconstitutional. First, the Court held that the Bail 
Reform Act did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Court noted that “the 
Government’s regulatory interest in community safety can, in appropriate circumstances, outweigh an 
individual’s liberty interest” such that it passed a facial challenge. Id. at 748, 752. By framing the issue 
as such, the Court did not perceive detention as a form of conviction-free punishment. Second, the Court 
held that the Act did not violate the Excessive Bail Clause of the Eighth Amendment. It rejected an 
argument “that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits the government from pursuing other 
admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial release.” Id. at 753. The Court held that 
“when Congress has mandated detention on the basis of a compelling interest other than prevention of flight 
[i.e., danger to the community] . . . the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.” Id. at 754–55. 
  This is an astonishing statement. Justice Marshall’s powerful and eloquent dissent points out that 
under the majority’s logic, reductio ad absurdum, Congress can justify sweeping regulations that infringe 
upon individual freedom by simply stating it is attempting to regulate and protect, not punish. Id. at 760 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). While Justice Marshall’s call-out of the majority’s fallacy remains true, the 
constitutionality of the Bail Reform Act and the implications of Salerno are now beyond question. The 
current question is how to prevent Justice Marshall’s horrifying regulatory state from becoming a reality.  
  Now, ironically, Salerno serves as a potential pathway to challenge state and local money bail 
systems; reformers challenging state and local municipal challenges can use the rhetoric and logic from 
Salerno to raise substantive due process arguments even though Salerno itself did not directly engage in 
this analysis. For more information on this use of Salerno and the role of the federal courts in deciding 
the constitutionality of state and local bail systems, see Kellen Funk, The Present Crisis in American 
Bail, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1098, 1104–08 (2019).  
25 Patricia Mazzei & William K. Rashbaum, Jeffrey Epstein, Financier Long Accused of Molesting 
Minors, is Charged, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/06/nyregion/jeffrey-
epstein-arrested-sex-trafficking.html. Epstein was specifically charged with two counts of sex trafficking 
under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a), (b)(2), conspiracy to commit sex trafficking, and sex trafficking of minors, 
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included home detention, electronic monitoring, an extradition waiver, a 
bond secured by Epstein’s $77 million Manhattan home, his private jet, his 
brother’s West Palm Beach mortgage, a friend’s investment interests on two 
properties, a grant for pretrial and government services to randomly access 
his house, scheduled reporting to pretrial services, a prohibition on anyone 
other than Epstein and his attorneys entering the home, a trustee or trustees 
living with him, and more.26 Because Epstein’s charges involved trafficking 
of minor victims, there was a rebuttable presumption for his detention 
mandated by the Bail Reform Act.27 
On July 18, 2019, Epstein’s bail was denied.28 In a detailed order, Judge 
Berman of the District Court for the Southern District of New York found that 
Epstein was both a danger to the community29 and a flight risk.30 Judge Berman 
then found that the proposed bail package was not enough to rebut the 
presumption of detention.31 Notably, the court stated that “[t]he defense bail 
package proposes excessive involvement of the Court in routine aspects of Mr. 
Epstein’s proposed home confinement. This is not the Court’s function.”32  
For Epstein’s bail package to be successful, he needed to rebut the 
presumptions of both flight and danger; rebutting one is not enough under 
the Bail Reform Act. The crux of Epstein’s case, as noted by Judge Berman, 
was danger to the community prong.33 Epstein’s history and characteristics, 
including his vast fortune34 as well as the seriousness of the offense, weighed 
strongly against him.  
Yet there is a strong argument that Epstein’s bail package mitigated his 
risk of flight by the required preponderance of the evidence. Epstein’s 
package mandated: 24/7-armed security guards, electronic monitoring, a 
trustee in the home with him, daily check-ins with probation, cameras 
mounted at the front and rear entrances, a waiver of rights against 
 
which triggered the rebuttable presumption of the Bail Reform Act. Indictment at 11–12, United States 
v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 02, 2019), ECF No. 2.  
26 Letter Motion at 3–4, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 11, 
2019), ECF No. 6 [hereinafter Epstein Bail Package]. 
27 18 U.S.C § 3142(e). See also Epstein Bail Package, supra note 26, at 5 (explaining that the 
rebuttable presumption only shifts the burden of production to the defendant, with the government 
retaining the ultimate burden of persuasion). 
28 Benjamin Weiser & Ali Watkins, Jeffrey Epstein is Denied Bail in Sex Crimes Case, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 18, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com.2019/07/18/nyregion/jeffrey-epstein-bail-hearing.html.  
29 Decision & Order Remanding Defendant at 10–21, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-
RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2019), ECF No. 32 [hereinafter Epstein Order].  
30 Id. at 21–28. 
31 Id. at 29. 
32 Id. at 30 (citing United States v. Zarrab, 15 Cr 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 3681423, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 16, 2016)).  
33 Id. at 10 (“The Court begins with ‘dangerousness’ because that concept is at the heart of this 
case.”); Transcript of Bail Decision hearing at 3:6–8, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB 
(S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2019), ECF No. 40 (“I think it is fair to say that it is the heart of this decision, that is 
to say, dealing with danger to the others and to the community.”). 
34 His defense counsel represented his total assets to be $559,120,954. Epstein Order, supra note 
29, at 5.  
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extradition, requiring him to turn in his passport and restricting him from 
applying for another, and demobilizing all means of transportation.35 Each 
of these conditions cuts against fears of Epstein absconding by essentially 
creating a private prison. Despite his vast wealth, the court-controlled 
aspects of this package, such as the electronic monitoring, trustee, bonds, 
random check-ins, and “[a]ny other condition the Court deems necessary to 
reasonably assure Mr. Epstein’s appearance,” together take away his power 
to exercise his privileges to flee.36 Removing Epstein’s agency, despite his 
fame and fortune, arguably rebuts the presumption of flight, despite his 
history and characteristics and the severity of the crime.  
Whether the bail package mitigates danger to the community is more 
difficult. While the conditions above mitigate anyone’s leaving or entering 
the property, there are other ways in which Epstein poses a threat to the 
community. As the Government points out in its motion for detention, 
Epstein had a history of witness intimidation.37 There was nothing in the 
package that could reasonably prevent either Epstein or someone acting on 
his behalf from harassing witnesses telephonically.38 This is where his bond 
package failed to check his agency; no condition prevented him from 
harassing witnesses from his home. But witness harassment remains a risk 
even from prison. If he were to have harassed witnesses in this case, Epstein 
would have likely used the exact same tactics of harassment from his home 
or jail.39 And home detention with cameras at all entry and egress points, as 
well as a trustee reporting to the court, mitigated any potential harm to 
victims or potential targets by Epstein’s hand.  
This is not to say that he should have been released; his history and 
characteristics, the severity of the crimes, his lack of compliance with sex 
offender requirements, and the presumption for detention all weigh strongly 
against any potential mitigating conditions. But one thing that should not, in 
this instance, have cut against his release was wealth. One of, if not the most, 
common thread in the Government’s opposition and Judge Berman’s Order 
was Epstein’s wealth. The court saw his wealth as opening up avenues for 
escape and further harm. But as Epstein’s attorneys pointed out in their 
motion for pretrial release, “the Bail Reform Act . . . authorizes release for 
 
35 Epstein Bail Package, supra note 26, at 3–4.  
36 Id. at 4. 
37 Letter Motion at 11, United States v. Epstein, No. 1:19-cr-00490-RMB (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2019), 
ECF No. 11. 
38 The Government notes in its motion that this had happened in Epstein’s previous case. Id.  
39 Chiefly, recruiting someone else to threaten witnesses. See VERA INST. OF JUST., PROSECUTING 
WITNESS TAMPERING, BAIL JUMPING, AND BATTERING FROM BEHIND BARS 3–5 (2006), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/Publications/prosecuting-witness-tampering-bail-jumping-and-
battering-from-behind-bars/legacy_downloads/Prosecuting.pdf (detailing the depth and pervasiveness of 
witness intimidation and tampering from behind bars in domestic violence cases). See also supra note 38 
(noting the witness harassment in Epstein’s prior case). 
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even wealthy defendants facing serious charges who travel and own property 
abroad.”40 His attorneys have a point.41  
Yet on August 1, 2019, a week after Epstein’s appeal, the Second Circuit 
issued United States v. Boustani.42 The decision was almost certainly 
targeted at Epstein; the Second Circuit had already affirmed the Eastern 
District of New York’s order to detain Jean Boustani, a wealthy defendant 
found to be a flight risk, on May 16, 2019.43 The timing of the issuance of 
this opinion and the clear effect that it had on Epstein’s appeal indicate that 
the Second Circuit seemed to be preempting any arguments for wealth 
discrimination that would be raised on appeal.44  
Jean Boustani is “a wealthy international businessman . . . . [and] a 
citizen of Lebanon, Antigua, and Barbuda and has no ties to the United 
States.”45 He was arrested while en route to the Dominican Republic and 
charged “in connection with a $ 2 billion fraud, bribery, and money 
laundering scheme.”46 Before a magistrate judge, he proposed a bail 
application of $2 million cash and a bond amount to be determined by the 
court.47 The magistrate judge found that Boustani “failed to present credible 
sureties to ensure his appearance and the safety of the community,” and so 
he was detained.48 Boustani subsequently appealed his decision to the 
district court.49 His new bail package included: a $20 million personal 
recognizance bond with $1 million in cash, surrendering all of his and his 
wife’s travel documents, supervision by pretrial services, home confinement 
with GPS monitoring secured by Guidepost Solutions, twenty-four hour 
armed former or off-duty law enforcement officers with two officers per 
shift, limiting visitors, and a consent to use of force.50 The court found that 
despite the package and Boustani’s assertion that it would be “impossible . . . 
to flee,”51 he was a flight risk. In part of its finding that there was no set of 
conditions that would reasonably assure Boustani’s appearance in court, the 
district court noted that “although this Defendant has vast financial resources 
to construct his own ‘private prison,’ the Court is not convinced ‘disparate 
 
40 Epstein Bail Package, supra note 26, at 2.  
41 The Bail Reform Act does allow the courts to consider “financial resources” as part of a 
defendant’s history and characteristics. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g)(3)(A).  
42 Boustani II, 932 F.3d 79, 79 (2d Cir. 2019). 
43 Id. at 80.  
44 See Dan Mangan, Jeffrey Epstein’s Long-Shot Bid to Get Bail for Child Sex Traffic Case Just 
Got Tougher Because of New Appeals Court Decision, CNBC: POLITICS (Aug. 1, 2019, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/08/01/jeffrey-epstein-bid-for-bail-in-sex-case-hurt-by-appeals-ruling.html 
(discussing the effect of Boustani II on Epstein’s appeal).  





50 Id. at 250. 
51 Id. at 251 (emphasis omitted). 
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treatment based on wealth is permissible under the Bail Reform Act.’”52 The 
district court focused on what it believed would be disparate treatment between 
a wealthy individual who could mitigate his flight risk through conditions he 
paid for, including security guards, and an indigent defendant who would be 
detained because of an inability to pay for these mitigating conditions.53 
On appeal, Boustani challenged the idea that no conditions could 
mitigate the finding that he was a flight risk, not the actual finding that he 
was a flight risk.54 In May 2019, the Second Circuit affirmed the district 
court by order. Two months later, and again, one week after Epstein’s appeal 
of his detention, the Second Circuit issued a full opinion “to explain that 
decision and to clarify the circumstances under which the Bail Reform Act 
permits a district court to release a defendant pending trial pursuant to a 
condition under which the defendant would pay for private armed security 
guards.”55 The Second Circuit explicitly rejected the concept of “a 
two-tiered bail system in which defendants of lesser means are detained 
pending trial while wealthy defendants are released to self-funded private 
jails.”56 Judge José A. Cabranes, author of the Boustani II opinion, noted 
that: 
It is a fundamental principle of fairness that the law protects 
“the interests of rich and poor criminals in equal scale, and its 
hand extends as far to each.” To interpret the Bail Reform Act 
as requiring district courts to permit wealthy defendants to 
employ privately funded armed guards where an otherwise 
similarly situated defendant without means would be detained 
would violate this core principle.57 
The language of the Boustani II opinion extends far beyond the capacity 
to pay for armed guards. It expresses the concern for “granting bail to 
defendants because of their wealth.”58 The idea being that releasing 
defendants on conditions that they can afford because of their wealth creates 
a disparate effect between them and indigent defendants.59 The finding that 
no set of conditions could assure Boustani’s appearance was, in part, based 
upon the court’s desire to avoid disparate treatment between Boustani and 
his codefendants.60  
 
52 Id. at 258 (quoting United States v. Bruno, 89 F. Supp. 3d 425, 432 (E.D.N.Y. 2015)). 
53 Id. (citing United States v. Esposito, 749 F. App’x 20, 24 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order)). 
54 Boustani II, 932 F.3d 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019). 
55 Id. at 80.  
56 Id. at 82.  
57 Id. (citation omitted). 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 Id. at 83; see also Boustani I, 356 F. Supp. 3d. 246, 258 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Although courts in 
this jurisdiction have permitted private jail solutions where there was no possibility one ‘defendant might 
be detained while a wealthy defendant could be released with a private guard solution,’ Defendant’s 
release could very well produce disparate treatment based on wealth, as other co-defendants may not 
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The only exception that the Boustani II court carved out is “where the 
defendant is deemed to be a flight risk primarily because of his wealth.”61 This 
loops back to United States v. Sabhnani, where the Second Circuit held that 
defendants of means could not be designated as flight risks because of their 
resources where indigent defendants would most likely have been released.62 
The Sabhnani court purposefully did not address “whether it would be ‘contrary 
to principles of detention and release on bail’ to allow wealthy defendants ‘to 
buy their way out by constructing a private jail.’”63 The Boustani II court 
carefully noted that courts cannot detain individuals where “but for” their wealth 
they would have been released in the spirit of Sabhnani.64  
The ramifications of Boustani II go beyond Jeffrey Epstein. What the 
Second Circuit has essentially held is that individuals who are otherwise 
releasable will now be detained because of their wealth, despite the 
exception the court carved out to prevent individuals from being detained 
because of their wealth as in Sabhnani. The consequence of the Boustani II 
logic is that even if conditions that can be purchased would mitigate 
detention for a wealthy individual, they must be detained because they can 
afford those conditions, while indigent defendants cannot. Because of their 
wealth, certain criminal defendants are able to create bail packages that 
mitigate a finding of either flight or danger; under the Bail Reform Act, they 
are thus releasable.65 The Second Circuit instead focused on the disparate 
impact this path—the one explicitly authorized by the Bail Reform Act— 
would have. Section 3142(c)(1) says that a “judicial officer shall order the 
pretrial release . . . (B) subject to the least restrictive further condition, or 
combination of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of 
. . . the community.”66 The Bail Reform Act mandates release when there 
are conditions that afford it, even if it leads to the disparate effects the 
Boustani II court feared. And the Bail Reform Act mandates that this be done 
under the “least restrictive” conditions possible.67  
The Second Circuit correctly noted that the Bail Reform Act was not meant 
to be a tool to further disenfranchisement or wealth-based discrimination or 
disparities.68 But the court’s reasoning and result also cut against the purpose of 
the Bail Reform Act by now detaining people who can propose and afford bail 
 
currently possess the financial capacity to pay for the private jail solution Defendant requests.” (citation 
omitted)). 
61 Boustani II, 932 F.3d at 82.   
62 United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 78 n.18 (2d Cir. 2007) (“We note, however, that in the 
instant case, defendants of lesser means, lacking the resources to flee, might have been granted bail in 
the first place.”).  
63 Id. (citation omitted). 
64 Boustani II, 932 F.3d at 82.  
65 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
66 Id. (emphasis added).  
67 Id. (emphasis added). 
68 Boustani II, 932 F.3d at 82. 
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packages that “reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and 
the safety of any other person and the community.”69  
These two cases create and illuminate the tension between bail decisions 
and wealth; Boustani II specifically creates the problem that this Note seeks 
to address. How can the Bail Reform Act be read in order to maximize 
release for all defendants, irrespective of wealth?  
II.  LAW GOVERNING THE PRETRIAL DETENTION PROCESS 
It is worthwhile to first explain how pretrial detention works and what 
judges consider when deciding whether to detain someone. First, a defendant 
must be released if the court finds that a personal recognizance or unsecured 
bond is enough to ensure the defendant’s appearance at trial.70 There is no 
finding of flight risk or danger to the community needed; § 3142(b) 
mandates release just on personal recognizance or unsecured bond.71 It is 
only if the court finds that the defendant is a flight risk or a danger to the 
community where additional conditions are warranted.72 But there is still a 
presumption for release because § 3142(c) says that if a personal 
recognizance or unsecured bond is not enough to mitigate flight risk or 
danger to the community, the “judicial officer shall order the pretrial release 
of the person” subject to conditions.73 
In the Boustani I district court opinion, the court describes the analysis 
under the Bail Reform Act:  
A district court undertakes a two-step inquiry when evaluating 
an application for bail. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). First, the 
Court must determine whether the Government has 
established the defendant presents a danger to the community 
or a risk of flight. See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). Second, if the 
Government meets its initial burden, the Court must determine 
whether no conditions or combination of conditions of release 
could reasonably assure the defendant will not flee or will not 
endanger others. See United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 
75 (2d Cir. 2007).74 
To make this determination, § 3142(g) provides factors the factors the 
court considers: the nature and circumstances of the offense; the weight of 
the evidence; the defendant’s history and characteristics, including family 
 
69 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
70 Id. § 3142(a)–(b).  
71 Id. § 3142(b) (mandating release on personal recognizance “unless the judicial officer determines 
that such release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the 
safety of any other person or the community”). 
72 Id. § 3142(c).  
73 Id. 
74 Boustani I, 356 F. Supp. 3d. 246, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2019). 
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ties to the area, employment, finances, past conduct, substance abuse, 
criminal history, and prior probation violations; and the danger to the 
community if the defendant were released.75 Because courts are not bound 
by the rules of evidence for bail determinations, they can also consider 
information provided by proffer and uncharged conduct.76 The categories of 
flight risk and danger to the community have different standards of proof. 
The court must find that the conditions mitigate a danger to the community 
by clear and convincing evidence,77 whereas it finds the conditions mitigate 
a flight risk by a preponderance of the evidence.78 
Under §§ 3142(e)(2) and (e)(3), there are rebuttable presumptions when 
“no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the safety 
of any other person and the community”79 and when the defendant is charged 
with narcotics and firearms charges.80 These categories also help determine 
whether the defendant is a flight risk (as a previous violator) or a danger to 
the community (based upon the charge).81 In rebuttable presumption cases, 
“a defendant bears a limited burden of production—not a burden of 
persuasion—to rebut that presumption by coming forward with evidence 
that he does not pose a danger to the community or a risk of flight.”82 The 
rebuttable presumption then becomes a factor that the court weighs along 
with the others under § 3142(g), and the government bears the ultimate 
burden of persuasion that the defendant is a a flight risk or danger to the 
community by the respective standards of proof.83 This means the defendant 
could still be detained even after successfully rebutting the presumption.84 
Section 3142(f) contains a defendant’s pretrial procedural rights. It 
includes the right to representation, an opportunity to testify, present 
witnesses, cross-examine, and proffer information, not covered by the rules 
of evidence.85 A defendant detained by a magistrate judge may appeal the 
decision to a district judge and may request permission for an interlocutory 
appeal to appeal the bail decision to a circuit court.86 Sections 3145(b) and 
 
75 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); U.S. CTS., ORDER OF DETENTION PENDING TRIAL (2016) [hereinafter Form 
AO 472], https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/ao472.pdf.  
76 See United States v. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d 85, 88 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting the requirement of a 
nexus between the charge and the conduct for it to be considered during the bail hearing). 
77 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 750 (1987). 
78 Boustani I, 356 F. Supp. 3d at 251.  
at 251. 
79 Form AO 472, supra note 75, at pt. II(A).  
80 Id. at pt. II(B). 
81 Id. at pt. II(A)–(B). 
82 United States v. Mercedes, 254 F.3d 433, 436 (2d Cir. 2001). 
83 Id.  
84 Form AO 472, supra note 75, at pt. II(C) (“The defendant has presented evidence sufficient to 
rebut the presumption, but after considering the presumption and the other factors discussed below, 
detention is warranted.”).  
85 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f).  
86 18 U.S.C. § 3145(b)–(c). 
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(c) govern the appellate rights that a detained defendant has, including 
expedited review.87  
Historically, pretrial detention was meant to ensure appearance at trial.88 
This ideology began to shift with the emergence of the 1966 Bail Reform 
Act.89 Although there was still a presumption for release in noncapital cases, 
the 1966 Bail Reform Act introduced the concept of weighing the evidence 
against the defendant in order to determine release.90 The 1984 Bail Reform 
Act capitalized on this concept and shifted the presumption for release only 
when the defendant’s “presence at trial could be reasonably guaranteed.”91 
But the 1984 Bail Reform Act does not actually have the purpose or 
requirement to prevent or reduce unnecessary pretrial detention.92 Yet the 
Senate Report notes “[t]he decision to provide for pretrial detention is in no 
way a derogation of the importance of the defendant’s interest in remaining 
at liberty prior to trial.”93 The idea of preventative detention is “that a 
defendant’s interest in remaining free prior to conviction is, in some 
circumstances, outweighed by the need to protect societal interests,”94 
namely the risk of flight and danger to the community. 
Pretrial detention is covered by the Constitution, but in a confused 
manner. It falls somewhere between the protections of the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, 
and Eighth Amendments.95 The Supreme Court in United States v. Salerno 
held that the Bail Reform Act did not facially violate the Due Process Clause 
or the Excessive Bail Clause.96 The Court did not explicitly address 
substantive due process, but Professor Kellan Funk advocates for a strong 
reading of Salerno, meaning the safeguards that the Salerno court found 
sufficient to uphold the Act are a floor; he uses this to argue that “[b]ecause 
substantive due process analysis turns on the fundamental nature of the right 
involved—pretrial liberty and its related rights to prepare a defense and be 
presumed innocent pending trial—an unaffordable bail amount may trigger 
heightened procedures even if the defendant is relatively wealthy.”97  
 
87 Id.  
88 Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 728–34. Even Salerno 
recognizes that flight is the core of pretrial bail. See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 753 (1987) 
(“While we agree that a primary function of bail is to safeguard the courts’ role in adjudicating the guilt 
or innocence of defendants, we reject the proposition that the Eighth Amendment categorically prohibits 
the government from pursuing other admittedly compelling interests through regulation of pretrial 
release.”).  
89 Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 739–45.  
90 Id. at 739–40. 
91 Id. at 747 (citation omitted).  
92 Marsh, supra note 17, at 16.  
93 S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 16, at 7. 
94 Id. (emphasis added). 
95 Catherine T. Struve, The Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1014–18 
(2013). It should also be noted that at the state level, the Fourteenth Amendment would also be 
implicated, but because this Note only focuses on federal pretrial detention, it is irrelevant here. 
96 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987).  
97 Funk, supra note 2424, at 1107–08. 
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While there are standards for police treatment during an arrest and 
standards for the treatment of sentenced criminals, there is a gap regarding 
the standards for treating pretrial detainees.98 The Salerno court found that 
pretrial detention is not penal but administrative in nature.99 This is based 
upon Bell v. Wolfish.100 In Bell, the Supreme Court of the United States held 
that punishment of pretrial detainees is unacceptable, but any other 
treatment, as long as it is reasonably related to a legitimate government 
purpose, is allowed.101 This has splintered into various approaches to claims, 
depending upon the time in detention, relating pretrial detention either closer 
to the arrest and Fourth Amendment context or the Eighth Amendment 
punishment context.102 It is understood “that at some point after arrest and 
prior to trial, the Fourth Amendment’s protections cease and substantive due 
process principles begin to govern the treatment of pretrial detainees.”103 So 
while it is clear and indisputable that pretrial detainees are covered by the 
Constitution, the boundaries of their rights are hazy. 
The interaction between these rights and the government’s interest in the 
safety of the community and in fair adjudication drives the need for a 
case-by-case assessment. Because of the compelling balance of interests at 
stake, “courts must be vigilant not to unduly rely upon a proffer of a set of 
accusations and weighty evidence in support thereof to substantiate an order 
of pretrial detention.”104 This requires “a careful balancing of all of the 
relevant factors . . . to ensur[e] that not even one defendant is unnecessarily 
deprived of her interest in liberty pending trial, all while protecting the 
community at large, and, by extension, ensuring the integrity of and respect 
for the criminal system.”105  
III. INEQUALITY AND INEQUITY AT THE PRETRIAL LEVEL 
The Second Circuit’s Boustani II decision quickly received backlash 
because of the court’s leveling down approach.106 Boustani II’s approach 
 
98 Struve, supra note 95, at 1014–18.  
99 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–47.  
100 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 530–43 (1979); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 746–47 (citing to Bell).  
101 Bell, 441 U.S. at 538 (“A court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of 
punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.”); see also 
Struve, supra note 95, at 1014–18 (discussing Wolfish and the ambiguity the decision created). 
102 See Struve, supra note 95, at 1018–32 (tracing the different ways lower courts have approached 
and decided detention cases).  
103 Id. at 1023.  
104 United States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 603–04 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). 
105 Id. at 604. 
106 See Catherine Foti, All Defendants Are Created Equal Under the Bail Reform Act—Or Are 
They?, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 2:15 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2019/08/14/all-
defendants-are-created-equal-under-the-bail-reform-act-or-are-they/#7a768f604262 (arguing that the 
Bail Reform Act is inherently inequitable, meaning the Boustani II court thus misconstrued the Act); 
Alexander Klein, 2nd Circ.’s Approach to Bail Is Backward, LAW360 (Aug. 4, 2019, 8:02 PM) 
https://www.law360.com/articles/1184921/2nd-circ-s-approach-to-bail-is-backward (noting that the 
“least restrictive” condition should have been met through hiring armed guards and the outcome is now 
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means that wealthy defendants who are otherwise releasable must be 
detained in order to prevent “a two-tiered system.”107 
The inequality problem here is the reverse of what is found in the state 
money-bail systems. In the state systems, many indigent defendants are 
detained because they cannot afford bail, thus being detained because of 
their wealth, or lack thereof.108 The Boustani II court explicitly held that in 
the federal system, wealthy defendants can be detained because of their 
wealth: “A similarly situated defendant of lesser means surely would be 
detained pending trial, and Boustani is not permitted to avoid such a result 
by relying on his own financial resources to pay for a private jail.”109 
The equality problem that Boustani II creates is that wealthy and 
indigent defendants are now being treated differently solely because of 
wealth. This is a problem on both sides. On one, individuals are being 
detained when they might otherwise be releasable solely because of their 
wealth. On the other, indigent individuals might be detained just because 
they cannot afford to create their own “private jails.” Both scenarios are 
problematic. The aim should be “rising all boats rather than sinking them.”110 
Under Boustani II, wealth has now become the rate-limiting factor 
despite the language of the Bail Reform Act.111 There is obviously a problem 
with treating individuals differently because of their wealth, whether rich or 
poor. But in this instance, disparate treatment of the wealthy leads to 
inequity for all. This is because the word “shall” is now being taken 
suggestively.112 As written in § 3142(c)(1)(B), if the judicial officer finds 
that flight risk and danger to the community have been mitigated, they 
“shall” release the defendant.113 Under Boustani II, courts can now refuse 
release, despite this “shall” language, for whatever larger, societal, moral 
reason the court may find. This broad discretion is a huge blow to the Bail 
Reform Act, making its mandates mere suggestions. 
 
that an individual is detained because of his wealth). See supra Part I for a discussion of the Boustani II case. 
107 Boustani II, 932 F.3d. 79, 82 (2d Cir. 2019).  
108 See Laura I. Appleman, Justice in the Shadowlands: Pretrial Detention, Punishment, & the Sixth 
Amendment, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1297, 1301 (2012) (telling the story of a New Jersey barber who 
could not afford $1,000 bail and was murdered in detention); Cherise Fanno Burdeen, The Dangerous 
Domino Effect of Not Making Bail, ATLANTIC (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/arc
hive/2016/04/the-dangerous-domino-effect-of-not-making-bail/477906/ (showing that nine out of ten 
individuals detained pretrial are detained because they cannot post bond).  
109 Boustani II, 932 F.3d. at 83. 
110 Klein, supra note 106. 
111 “The Bail Reform Act requires a defendant-specific analysis that is unavoidably inequitable.” 
Foti, supra note 106. 
112 “Shall,” in the legal context, is often understood to be mandatory. Bryan Garner, Shall We 
Abandon Shall?, ABA J. (Aug. 1, 2012, 7:20 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/shall
_we_abandon_shall. But it has not always been interpreted as such. See Town of Castle Rock v. 
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760 (2005) (“We do not believe that these provisions of Colorado law [stating 
that police “shall” act in certain ways] truly made enforcement of restraining orders mandatory.”). 
113 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
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There is a large problem with releasing wealthy defendants while 
indigent defendants remain locked up.114 But there is also a problem with 
detaining individuals presumed innocent because of their wealth. This is 
where “least restrictive” can be seen as the key to release for both wealthy 
and indigent defendants alike. 
This Note fits into a larger scheme of recent work in bail reform. As 
pretrial detention rates increase, more scholars are diverting their focus 
specifically to the assessment of defendants and findings of flight or 
dangerousness.115 A significant portion of pretrial bail scholarship is focused 
on the cash bail system and the inequities it creates.116 Some focus on 
criminology and the later effects of detention on the case outcome.117 But 
discussions of release conditions and the overall role of bail are increasing 
as well. That is where this Note fits in; this Note seeks to expand upon the 
discussion of release conditions.  
IV. “LEAST RESTRICTIVE” AS A KEY TO EQUALITY 
Within the Bail Reform Act, the key to equalization lies within one 
phrase: “least restrictive.”118 Tucked into the section on release conditions, 
the phrase “least restrictive” imposes a requirement on judges for how they 
shall release defendants. Under § 3142(c)(1)(B), a judge shall impose the 
“least restrictive further condition[s]” on a defendant if the requirements in 
§ 3142(b)119 do not mitigate findings of flight risk or danger to the 
community. This is the crux of the Bail Reform Act’s flexibility. The 
 
114 See Appleman, supra note 108, at 1299–1301 (discussing the dichotomy between the treatment 
and release of wealthy defendants such as Martha Stewart, Bernie Madoff, Rod Blagojevich, and others 
with the detention of a New Jersey barber for unpaid parking tickets and failure to register a new car).  
115 See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship on risk assessment).  
116 See supra notes 3, 21 (discussing money bail); see also Stephanie Holmes Didwania, The 
Immediate Consequences of Federal Pretrial Detention, 22 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 24, 24–25 (2020) 
(commenting that most pretrial bail reform, including scholarship, is focused on money bail).   
117 See Holmes Didwania, supra note 116, at 57 (finding “that federal pretrial detention appears to 
significantly increase sentences, decrease the probability that a defendant will receive a below-Guidelines 
sentence, and decrease the probability that they will avoid a mandatory minimum sentence if facing 
one”); Meghan Sacks & Alissa R. Ackerman, Bail and Sentencing: Does Pretrial Detention Lead to 
Harsher Punishment?, 25 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 59, 59, 70–72 (2012) (finding that pretrial detention 
“significantly and negatively affects the length of the sentence”); Jacqueline G. Lee, To Detain or Not to 
Detain? Using Propensity Scores to Examine the Relationship Between Pretrial Detention and 
Conviction, 30 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 128, 146–50 (2019) (detailing the results of a study finding that 
detention, independent from propensity scores, has an increased risk of a longer conviction in six counties 
in Florida). 
118 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). 
119 This section allows defendants to be released “on personal recognizance, or upon execution of 
an unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court, subject to the condition that the 
person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release and subject to the condition 
that the person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the person if the collection of such a 
sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000. . . .” 
18 U.S.C. § 3142(b).  
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conditions themselves120 are often key in the decision to detain or release. 
This Note suggests several different ways to approach the same conclusion: 
defendants should not be detained due to their wealth if they can be released. 
It is easy to read the “defendant-specific analysis” of the Bail Reform Act as 
“unavoidably inequitable.”121 But at the same time, the “defendant-specific 
analysis” affords flexibility to the judicial official deciding whether to grant 
or deny release.122 And if the Bail Reform Act is read in a way that favors 
release, then this specific analysis can be tailored to allow for a wider range 
of release based upon the conditions and what “least restrictive” means for 
that specific defendant. This means wealth can be factored into and out of 
the release calculus as needed, while not serving as the lynchpin for the 
decision to release or detain. 
First, the term “least restrictive” should be read in light of the original 
purpose of pretrial detention, guaranteeing appearance at trial, while taking 
into account the liberty-focused language of the Senate Report regarding the 
1982 Bail Reform Act. Second, practical approaches about the Bail Reform 
Act and pretrial detention process suggest that the ability to afford conditions 
with independent money should not be a defining factor to release; the mere 
ability to afford conditions should not be considered, while the conditions 
themselves should. Finally, key societal concerns demonstrate that “least 
restrictive” should be read in favor of release whenever any findings of flight 
risk or danger to the community are mitigated, regardless of wealth.  
A. A Purposeful Approach to Release 
As originally enacted in 1966, the Bail Reform Act favored release.123 
With the adoption of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and the category of “danger 
to the community” came a shift in legislative purpose.124 One obvious way 
to read “least restrictive” is in light of the presumption of innocence 
contained within the Act with the intention of furthering release and the 
original idea of detention only as a means to assure trial appearance.  
“Least restrictive” lies in the eye of the judge. While the 1984 Bail 
Reform Act is more strict than its predecessors, detention was still meant 
 
120 See supra Part II for a discussion of the pretrial detention process and the role that conditions play.  
121 Foti, supra note 106.  
122 Id.  
123 Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 739. Release before trial 
was the norm before the 1980s. See id. at 728–39 (discussing historical understandings of the 
presumption of innocence); Appleman, supra note 108, at 1323–35 (discussing the history of bail).  
124 S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra note 16, at 3 (“The adoption of these changes marks a significant 
departure from the basic philosophy of the Bail Reform Act, which is that the sole purpose of bail laws 
must be to assure the appearance of the defendant at judicial proceedings.”). There is a large body of 
scholarly work challenging the underlying assumption of this statement: recidivism. For instance, 49.7% 
of prisoners released in 2005 “had either a parole or probation violation or an arrest for a new offense 
within 3 years [of release] that led to imprisonment.” MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER & 
HOWARD N. SYNDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: 
PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf.  
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“[o]nly in rare circumstances . . . and doubts regarding the propriety of 
release should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.”125 This rationale was 
reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. 
Salerno.126 But the Court noted that the Bail Reform Act’s preventative 
detention was only meant for “the most serious of crimes.”127 The Salerno 
Court used this factor to find that the Bail Reform Act did not violate 
substantive due process, without using so many words.128  
This language and rationale restore a purpose of release to the Bail Reform 
Act. The Court’s rationale is rooted in the idea that “[i]n our society liberty is 
the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial is the carefully limited 
exception.”129 The crux of the Court’s reading of constitutionality was based 
upon the idea that pretrial detention was a limited option. By limiting 
preventative detention to only rebuttable presumption cases, the Supreme 
Court found the Bail Reform Act constitutional because it does not “deny [] 
the right to bail altogether.”130 This is because, in the Supreme Court’s 
reading, the Bail Reform Act authorizes release for everyone except those who 
committed offenses listed in § 3142(f). It is axiomatic that bail cannot be 
altogether denied if it is supposed to be granted but for limited situations. 
Yet modern courts are detaining more than ever. One of the key effects 
of modern day pretrial detention is that it essentially serves as a 
“mini-trial.”131 Judges are allowed to weigh the evidence against a defendant 
in order to decide whether to release or detain.132 And the decision to detain 
 
125 United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991). 
126 481 U.S. 739; see also supra note 24. 
127 Id. at 747 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f)). See also Funk, supra note 24, at 1105–07 (discussing the 
Salerno Court’s reasoning). 
128 Funk, supra note 24, at 1106 (“Salerno came right up to the precipice of engaging in a 
substantive due process analysis without explicitly invoking those terms.”). 
129 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 755. But compare this to Justice Marshall’s fiery dissent, where he states 
that the majority has allowed 
a person innocent of any crime [to] be jailed indefinitely, pending the trial of 
allegations which are legally presumed to be untrue, if the Government shows to the 
satisfaction of a judge that the accused is likely to commit crimes, unrelated to the 
pending charges, at any time in the future.  
Id. at 755 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
130 Funk, supra note 24, at 1107. 
131 See Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, supra note 15, at 752–54, 770–72 
(detailing the advent of the weighing of the evidence as part of the 1984 Bail Reform Act and arguing as 
part of her thesis that judges should not weigh the evidence, essentially determining guilt, in determining 
bail). Some courts have minimized the importance that the weight of the evidence plays in the bail 
determination because of these concerns. See United States v. Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d 600, 613 
(S.D.N.Y. 2018) (“To avoid punishment for a crime for which a defendant ‘has not yet been shown to 
have committed,’ many courts have suggested that the weight of the evidence is the least important of 
the various factors.” (citations omitted)).  
132 Form AO 472, supra note 7579, at Part II(C).  
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has a domino effect on the rest of the criminal process.133 But, on principle, 
judges “must be vigilant not to unduly rely upon a proffer of a set of 
accusations and weighty evidence in support thereof to substantiate an order 
of pretrial detention.”134 The rise of the finding of a danger to the community 
and the rebuttable presumption for detention have shifted the burden away 
from the Government to prove that “no condition or combination of 
conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required 
and the safety of any other person and the community.”135  
The rise of modern detention can be linked to a shift in charging. As 
Matthew Rowland, Chief of the Probation and Pretrial Services Office notes: 
“The risk of flight and criminogenic profile of defendants in the federal 
system has steadily worsened over the years, in part because of the focus of 
federal prosecutions.”136 The shift to charging repeat offenders or the 
offenses that were enumerated as serious crimes within the act, such as “drug 
and human trafficking, violence, weapons, [and] sex crimes” correlates with 
the rise of detention.137 What was meant to be detention in “rare 
circumstances” has now become the norm.138  
Because the focus of prosecutions has shifted, it is paramount that the 
focus of the Bail Reform Act shifts. While the 1984 Bail Reform Act may 
have been more restrictive than its predecessor, detention was not intended 
to be the norm. In order to return to the norm of detention in only extreme 
circumstances, a purposeful approach for release must be implemented. This 
in turn helps to equalize the pretrial detention process. The criteria for 
detention or release may be objective,139 but the demographics of those 
detained are disproportional because of those who are being charged. 
Returning to a purpose of release helps even this playing field and undoes 
the damage of prosecutorial focus. 
Equalizing release may come from a counterintuitive concept: release of 
wealthy defendants. One major reason why there is such an inherent reaction 
 
133 Stephanie Holmes Didwania conducted a survey across seventy-one federal jurisdictions and 
discovered three ways in which pretrial detention affects sentencing. First, it can affect sentencing by 
hindering a defendant’s ability to engage in their own defense. Second, released defendants can more 
easily engage in post-offense rehabilitative efforts, which can be used for mitigation at sentencing. Third, 
detained defendants may suffer representativeness bias as being more likely to recidivate than released 
defendants. For more about her study, see Holmes Didwania, supra note 116116, at 25–26.  
134 Paulino, 335 F. Supp. 3d at 604 (Carter, Jr., J.) (addressing, on remand from the Second Circuit, 
his rationale for releasing the defendant and his perceptions of the standards within the Bail Reform Act). 
135 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e)(1).  
136 Rowland, supra note 2, at 18. 
137 Id. Rowland also notes the shift in focus also includes illegal entry into the United States, but 
this is outside the scope of the Bail Reform Act.  
138 United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir. 1991). See also Rowland, supra note 2, 
at 17 (noting that the § 3142(e) rebuttable presumption cases are “growing larger than the rule in favor 
of release”). 
139 But see Rowland, supra note 2, at 14 n.5 (“Note, not everyone considers the statutory factors to 
be unbiased. Some civil rights organizations argue that factors such as prior failures to appear and rearrest 
are more reflective of police and prosecutors’ decisions than the conduct of the defendants (Pretrial Justice).”). 
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to the idea of releasing wealthy defendants based on conditions they can 
afford is the idea they are being released to “a very expensive form of private 
jail.”140 Courts have recently struggled with the idea that the conditions 
necessary to release wealthy defendants have become so extensive that home 
release has become another form of detention.141 Take for example United 
States v. Valerio, where the court addressed “whether a defendant, if she is 
able to perfectly replicate a private jail in her own home at her own cost, has 
a right to do so under the Bail Reform Act and the United States 
Constitution.”142 The issue is essentially: when do restrictions become more 
than the “least restrictive” possible?  
In light of the purpose of the Bail Reform Act, “least restrictive” actually 
becomes quite expansive. There is nothing in the language of the Act to 
restrict the conditions besides judicial discretion.143 There is a set list of 
conditions that judicial officers can apply, but § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv) allows 
for defendants to “satisfy any other condition that is reasonably necessary to 
assure the appearance of the person as required and to assure the safety of 
any other person and the community.”144 And judicial officers can apply 
“any other condition that is reasonably necessary” in order to find the 
defendant releasable.145 The Federal Probation and Pretrial Services Office 
came up with a comprehensive list of conditions that can be imposing, 
showing how defendant specific they can be.146 The issue raised in United 
States v. Valerio takes effect when a judge imposes a laundry list of 
conditions in order to ensure release.  
Reading “least restrictive” in light of the purpose for release, “least 
restrictive” becomes more of a requirement on fairness than quantity of 
conditions. This means that to counterbalance the inequity of who is being 
charged and detained, certain conditions can help shift the purpose of the 
Act to focus on release. In response to the Valerio court’s concern, there is 
nothing in the Bail Reform Act that says house arrest is not an acceptable 
condition;147 the problem comes when wealth is added to the picture. “Least 
restrictive” here does not mean a restriction on the conditions themselves. 
 
140 United States v. Zarrab, 15 CR 867 (RMB), 2016 WL 3681423, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2016).  
141 Id. (discussing the approaches in United States v. Banki, 369 F. App’x 152 (2d Cir. 2010) and 
United States v. Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d 283 (E.D.N.Y. 2014)). 
142 Valerio, 9 F. Supp. 3d, at 292.  
143 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B). If the restrictions in § 3142(b) are inadequate, a “judicial officer shall 
order the pretrial release of the person . . . subject to the least restrictive further condition, or combination 
of conditions, that such judicial officer determines will” mitigate flight or danger to the community.  
144 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1)(B)(xiv). 
145 Id.  
146  See generally PROBAT. & PRETRIAL SERVS. OFFIC., ADMIN. OFFIC. OF THE U.S. CTS, OVERVIEW 
OF PROBATION AND SPECIALIZED RELEASE CONDITIONS (2016), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/defau
lt/files/overview_of_probation_and_supervised_release_conditions_0.pdf [hereinafter PROBATION 
CONDITIONS]. Some conditions are incredibly specific, including computer and internet restrictions, 
gambling-related conditions, and restrictions on viewing sexually explicit materials, to name a few. Id.  
147 See id. at 72–73 (listing home detention and home incarceration as type of location monitoring conditions). 
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Instead, it is meant to be a low bar for judges in order to establish release 
without unduly burdening defendants. One way to help ground this 
perspective is to note that since the Federal Pretrial Services Act and of 1982 
and the Bail Reform Act, both the number of individuals monitored and 
detained have increased, even though they likely would have been released 
prior to these acts.148  
There is nothing specific within the Bail Reform Act that prevents 
defendants from being placed under house arrest, even if the option is only 
available because of the defendant’s wealth. While the Valerio court’s 
concern is valid that the conditions themselves can become so restrictive, 
they are akin to detention, that is not an affront to the Bail Reform Act. 
“Least restrictive” in this context is a floor, not a ceiling; as long as the 
conditions are such that they are the least that the judge finds mitigates any 
finding of flight or danger, it is in line with the Act. And, in the imposition 
of “least restrictive” conditions, judges “must be clear-eyed about the precise 
risks they are trying to avoid or mitigate.”149  
Because the Bail Reform Act should be read in light of a purpose to 
release, bearing in mind the origin of pretrial detention, the release of 
wealthy defendants should not be seen as inequitable. It instead should be 
seen as an opportunity to further the release of all defendants, regardless of 
wealth, by focusing on releasing all defendants through the imposition of 
fair, and not overly burdensome, conditions.  
B. A Practical Approach to Release 
Another way to address pretrial release and wealth disparities is to 
approach the Bail Reform Act practically. Reading “least restrictive” in a 
practical, methodical way allows for the release of both wealthy and indigent 
defendants, without harm to the other.  
“Practical,” in this sense, means refocusing on the language of the Bail 
Reform Act. “Least restrictive” practically means that defendants should be 
released as long as there are conditions they can be released under. But even 
before that, a practical reading means noting that this section of the Act does 
not, and should not, even apply to all defendants. As noted above, the “least 
restrictive” language only applies when there is first a finding of flight risk 
or danger to the community.150 And even if the least restrictive requirement 
applies, it is still under the presumption of release.151 To practically interpret 
the Bail Reform Act would mean to read the language of the Act as written 
and find that release is required if: (a) there are conditions that mitigate a 
finding of flight risk or danger to the community; and (b) the charge does 
 
148 James Byrne & Jacob Stowell, The Impact of the Federal Pretrial Services Act of 1982 on the 
Release, Supervision, and Detention of Pretrial Defendants, 71 FED. PROB. 31, 32 (2007).  
149 Lauryn P. Gouldin, Defining Flight Risk, 85 UNIV. CHI. L. REV. 677, 741 (2018). 
150 See supra p. 453–55 (discussing how the Bail Reform Act functions). 
151 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(1) (utilizing the term “shall” to mandate release). 
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not fall under § 3141(f)(1). Courts have also held that in considering the 
factors listed in determining mitigation in the Bail Reform Act,152 a “court 
should bear in mind that it is only a ‘limited group of offenders’ who should 
be denied bail pending trial.”153 Thus, a practical approach, one that most 
closely models the language of the text, is one that allows for release for the 
majority of defendants. 
And even if a case falls under § 3142(f)(1), the language again asks 
“whether any condition or combination of conditions set forth in subsection 
(c) of this section [where our “least restrictive” language is] will reasonably 
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”154 While there is a higher hurdle in rebuttable 
presumption cases, it is just a hurdle, not a bar to release.155 It again relies 
upon whether there are conditions that mitigate flight risk or danger to the 
community. And, even in rebuttable presumption cases, “[t]he Government 
retains the ‘ultimate burden of persuasion’ that” the defendant is a flight risk 
or danger to the community.156 
This is all to say that allowing wealthy defendants to pay for conditions 
is allowable by the Bail Reform Act if it mitigates a finding of flight risk or 
danger to the community. There is a very strong case to say twenty-four-hour 
home detention under watch by a security company approved by the 
government would do so.157  
In United States v. Tajideen, the District Court for the District of D.C. 
specifically noted the defendant’s “financial means[,] even though some of 
those funds may not be available to him” as a reason for concluding “that no 
condition or combination of conditions would in fact ensure [the 
defendant’s] appearance before this Court for future proceedings.”158 In its 
analysis, the court focused on the fact that there was nothing to suggest that 
a $2 million cash bond and posting the defendant’s brother’s home as 
security “would impact [the defendant] sufficiently to ensure [his] presence 
 
152 See supra pp. 485–87 (listing court’s analysis at this stage and the factors to be considered). 
153 United States v. Shakur, 817 F.2d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 1987) (quoting S. REP. NO. 98-225, supra 
note 16, at 7). 
154 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f). 
155 See Rowland, supra note 2, at 17 (relating that § 3142(e) is an exception now swallowing the 
presumption for release). Rowland also cites studies that show “that the enumerated offenses [in § 
3142(e)] may not be the best predictors of risk of flight or danger to the community.” Id.   
156 Epstein Order, supra note 29, at 9 (citation omitted). 
157 This option has been called “a magic pill” for release because of how it completely mitigates 
fears of flight risk or danger to the community. Klein, supra note 106. For this option to actually be 
“guaranteed release,” there needs to be no concern that the security company will look the other way if 
a defendant slips out the back door. It may be in certain cases that the imposition of armed guards alone 
is not enough because of this worry, or other conditions are more reliable. This, however, is beyond the 
scope of this Note. This Note advocates not for one specific condition, but a reconsideration of the way 
judges impose conditions.  
158 United States v. Tajideen, No. 17-46 (RBW), 2018 WL 1342475, at *3 (D.D.C. Mar. 15, 2018) 
(alterations in original).  
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at trial” because of his vast resources.159 The court rejected the defendant’s 
argument “that he should not be prevented from obtaining pretrial release 
due to [his] wealth.”160 The court instead found “that permitting a vastly 
wealthy defendant ‘to basically buy [his] way out of pretrial detention by 
coming up with a plan consistent with what is being proposed here’ to be 
wholly ‘inconsistent with [the purpose and] the reason for . . . the Bail 
Reform Act . . . .’”161 Here, the court first used the defendant’s wealth to find 
that he was a flight risk,162 then used his wealth to say that he should not be 
allowed to buy his way out of detention. This means that the deciding factor 
in Tajideen’s detention was his wealth.  
That is not to say that Tajideen should have been released. In Tajideen’s 
case, he was charged with serious offenses including unlawful transactions 
with terrorists and aiding and abetting terrorist acts.163 He was also “a citizen 
of Belgium, Sierra Leone, and Lebanon and has no significant ties to the 
District of Columbia or the United States.”164 The court instead focused on 
the tie to Lebanon, a non-extradition country, only cursorily in its discussion 
of the security company Tajideen proposed to monitor him.165 The problem 
with the court’s analysis in this case is its focus on his wealth as the factor 
for his flight risk and detention. Again, Tajideen might have fairly been 
detained; but finding he was wealthy and therefore a flight risk—and finding 
he was wealthy and therefore not releasable—is not equalizing the system.  
The ability to pay for certain conditions does not and should not always 
mitigate certain findings of flight or danger to the community. In Epstein’s 
case, the fake passport and possession of private planes, even if one was 
posted as a bond, lends credence to the idea that he  would be a flight risk 
even if he had a GPS monitor and armed guards.166 And, in cases where there 
is a rebuttable presumption for detention, like in Epstein’s, possession of a 
fake passport and a plane does not rebut the presumption that he was not a 
flight risk despite his mitigating conditions.  
 
159 Id. at *4 (alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 41, 46 
(D.D.C. 2013)).  
160 Id. at *6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citation omitted).  
161 Id. The court also quoted Allen v. United States, saying that “[r]espect for law and order is 
diminished when the attainment of pretrial liberty depends solely upon the financial status of an accused.” 
386 F.2d 634, 637 (D.C. Cir. 1967). This analysis, however, cuts both ways. This is no different than the 
Boustani II court saying that because of wealth, the defendant would be detained.  
162 One recent, powerful argument has also focused on redefining how courts interpret what it means 
to be a flight risk. This is also a crucial aspect of increasing defendant’s release pretrial, as the rebuttable 
presumption for detention only applies when a defendant is found to be a flight risk or a danger to the 
community. See generally Gouldin, supra note 149 (creating three categories for flight to recenter court’s 
approach and separate findings of flight and danger). 
163 Tajideen, 2018 WL 1342475, at *1. 
164 Id. at *2.  
165 Id. at *7.  
166 See supra Part I (discussing Epstein’s bail package).  
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 “Least restrictive” factors in by looking practically at the statistics of 
pretrial misconduct with the language of the Bail Reform Act.167 From 2008 
to 2010, only 1% of federal defendants released pretrial failed to make their 
court appearances.168 But in cases with wealthy defendants, their wealth 
plays a factor in finding them flight risks.169 Another way to phrase the 
debate is this: does wealth truly make an individual a flight risk?170 There is 
no data on the wealth of the 1% of released defendants who fail to make 
court appearances. Courts’ consideration of wealth in relation to detention 
is cyclical. Because of the defendant’s wealth, courts require more 
conditions in order to find that the danger of a flight risk is mitigated. Even 
though flight risk is to be met by a preponderance of the evidence, the mere 
factor of wealth appears to make a finding of mitigation impossible.  
Flight is a real concern; there is a (very small) group of defendants who 
flee, regardless of wealth.171 And, in rebuttable presumption cases like 
Epstein’s, courts have a statutory duty to assess the case under the 
presumption that there is no set of conditions that would mitigate flight. But 
courts should focus their energy back on the language of the Bail Reform 
Act, especially in light of the low statistics of flight in wealthy cases: 
“whether any condition or combination of conditions . . . will reasonably 
assure the appearance of such person as required and the safety of any other 
person and the community.”172 This is a purposefully high bar for rebuttable 
presumption cases. The language of the Bail Reform Act reflects that it must 
be impossible to impose any conditions that will mitigate either flight risk or 
danger to the community to detain. And the court only needs to find these 
conditions mitigated by a reasonable assurance, not an absolute. This 
language implies that even “private prisons” would be acceptable because it 
is a condition that would reasonably assure both appearance and a minimized 
danger to the community. 
Take again Sabhnani. There, a wealthy couple was charged with forced 
labor and harboring undocumented immigrants for holding two women as 
captives for domestic labor.173 The district court, after multiple proceedings 
 
167 Pretrial misconduct is defined as “[i]nstances in which a released defendant violated their pretrial 
release conditions.” THOMAS H. COHEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., PRETRIAL RELEASE AND MISCONDUCT IN 
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS, 2008–2010 19 (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/prmfdc0810.pdf.  
168 Id. at 1.  
169 Gouldin, supra note 149, at 709 n.172 (giving examples from the First and Ninth circuits where 
courts have analyzed a defendant’s resources in evaluating flight risk); Appleman, supra note 108, at 
1299 (“Notwithstanding crime, the decision to imprison a defendant before trial all too often hinges on 
wealth and power.”).  
170 In her article, Professor Gouldin puts wealthier defendants in the category of “true flight risks” 
because of their resources. Gouldin, supra note 149, at 727. But she also advocates for a defendant and 
context-specific approach, calling for research to “study and evaluate whether selectively applying 
financial conditions can effectively discourage flight for released defendants who have resources.” Id. 
This is in line with the approach this Note advocates for. 
171 Id. at 683. 
172 18 U.S.C. § 3142(f) (emphasis added).  
173 United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2007).  
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and some back and forth between the parties, found that no conditions could 
mitigate a flight risk based upon the defendants’ financial disclosures, ability 
to conduct business overseas, the strength of the evidence and lengthy prison 
sentence if convicted, and a conclusion “that home detention was impractical 
because it would require the imposition of onerous monitoring conditions on 
defendants’ children, none of whom was charged with criminal conduct.”174 
Judge Reena Raggi eloquently simplified the issue before the court and 
rejected any further arguments from the government: 
The Sabhnanis do not challenge the district court's finding that, 
if released, they pose a serious risk of flight. Rather, they 
challenge its conclusion that no conditions can be imposed that 
would reasonably assure their presence at trial. We generally 
accord considerable deference to such a district court 
conclusion. In this case, however, defendants’ argument has 
been cast in a new light by the government's identification in 
this court of the further conditions it deems necessary to 
ameliorate the risk of flight . . . . The government's ability to 
identify such conditions and the defendants’ willingness to 
accede to them preclude a conclusion in this case that no 
conditions of release would reasonably assure the defendants’ 
presence at trial.175  
This quite aptly sums up why home detention is not a problem under the 
Bail Reform Act: because home detention means that there are conditions 
that can be imposed that mitigate findings of flight. “Private prisons” in 
one’s home are acceptable under this practical view of the Bail Reform Act 
because the creation of a “private prison” means that there are conditions 
which can be imposed to merit release. This reading fits with § 
3142(c)(1)(B). Within § 3142(c)(1)(B), there is no limitation on what “least 
restrictive” means. For a practical reading towards release, “least restrictive” 
might actually be quite expansive; all that matters is that it is the least 
restrictive means under which the mitigation is met.  
One of the issues raised in the Epstein opinion is that the imposition of 
such intensive restrictions is “not the Court’s function.”176  But home 
detention is not uncommon for pretrial release.177 Notably, in 1987, the 
Federal Judicial Board178 found that “home confinement may often qualify 
as the least restrictive method of accomplishing the purposes of pretrial 
 
174 Id. at 73. 
175 Id. at 64–65. 
176 Epstein Order, supra note 29, at 30. 
177 See PROBATION CONDITIONS, supra note 146, at 72–73 (listing the different methods of home 
confinement as conditions). 
178 Interestingly, this Board included then District Judge José Cabranes, author of the Second 
Circuit’s Boustani II opinion. PAUL J. HOFER & BARBARA S. MEIERHOEFER, FED. JUD. CTR., HOME 
CONFINEMENT: AN EVOLVING SANCTION IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1987). 
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release conditions.”179 Since then, the Pretrial Services Office has 
recommended and monitored home confinement, with room for 
improvement.180 While home confinement for wealthy individuals might not 
be the least restrictive means, the Sabhnani opinion shows the kind of 
defendant-specific analysis required by the Bail Reform Act in considering 
home confinement for the wealthy. The Sabhnani court carefully 
distinguished United States v. Orena, a prior Second Circuit opinion where 
the court “expressed serious reservations about the adequacy of home 
confinement as a substitute for detention in cases involving violent 
crime.”181 The Sabhnani court found that there was a presumption for release 
under the Bail Reform Act, that there were conditions such as visual 
surveillance and electronic monitoring to minimize circumvention, that the 
defendants proposed to pay all costs, that the government chose the private 
security firm, and that the circumstances of violence in the underlying cases 
were incomparable.182  
One practical implication of an increase in conditions is “e-carceration.” 
E-carceration is a new movement focusing on the negative impact of 
conditions, including racial and social divides.183 The argument is centered 
around the idea that electronic monitoring conditions, namely an electronic 
ankle monitor, serve “as net-widening correctional strateg[ies]” expanding 
the reach of the carceral system.184 One major problem with location 
monitoring—often a facet of home release—is that “it replaces 
less-restrictive forms of pretrial release or parole and saddles people with 
the stigma and expense of ankle monitors.”185 As Professor Arnett notes, 
there is a correlation between pretrial detention reform and electronic 
 
179 Id. at 14.  
180 See Marsh, supra note 17, at 17 (commenting on how detention alternatives “were not always 
used or used effectively,” specifically noting that home confinement was imposed when it was not the 
least restrictive condition). Home incarceration, according to the Federal Probation and Pretrial Services 
office, is “24-hours-a-day lock-down except for medical necessities and court appearances or other 
activities specifically approved by the court.” PROBATION CONDITIONS, supra note 146, at 73. This is 
different from home detention, which “equires the defendant to remain at home at all times except for 
pre-approved and scheduled absences for employment, education, religious activities, treatment, attorney 
visits, court appearances, court-ordered obligations, or other activities as approved by the probation 
officer.” Id.  
181 United States v. Sabhnani, 493 F.3d 63, 77 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing United States v. Orena, 986 
F.2d 628, 632–33 (2d Cir. 1993)).  
182  Id. at 78. 
183 See Jessica Eaglin, Is E-Carceration a Problem? Confronting the Shortcomings of Technological 
Criminal Justice Reforms, JOTWELL (Aug. 2, 2019) (reviewing Professor Arnett’s article)). But see 
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., ELECTRONIC MONITORING REDUCES RECIDIVISM 1 (2011) 
(noting a study of Florida offenders “found that monitoring significantly reduces the likelihood of failure 
under community supervision” by a 31% decrease in the likelihood of failure).  
184 Chaz Arnett, From Decarceration to E-carceration, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 641, 641 (2019). 
185 E.A. Gjelten, House Arrest and Ankle Monitors: How Home Detention Works and When It’s 
Used, LAWYERS.COM (Feb. 27, 2019), https://www.lawyers.com/legal-info/criminal/criminal-law-
basics/home-confinement-as-an-alternative-to-prison.html.  
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monitoring.186 The crux, as he explains it, is the goal of fighting an increase 
in incarceration, the vast majority of which is pretrial detainees, as 
aforementioned.187 The problem then comes as electronic monitoring “shifts 
the site and costs of imprisonment from state facilities to vulnerable 
communities and households of color”188 and further entrenching 
marginalized groups via surveillance. 
The concerns of “e-carceration” guide what our release for indigent 
defendants should look like through a practical lens. Because the 
government is saved from the cost of detention by putting it onto wealthy 
defendants, theoretically, it eases the burden on the government such that 
more money can potentially be spent on conditions for indigent defendants 
to mitigate the Boustani problem. One suggested idea has been a give a 
guard, get a guard idea where wealthy defendants released to home detention 
chip into a pot, the proceeds of which go to paying for conditions for indigent 
defendants so they can also be released.189 This idea assumes that guards 
“virtually guarantee[]” the defendant’s appearance at court, thus 
immediately mitigating any flight risk.190 There is also an argument that in 
the case of defendants detained because of a flight risk, they have a right to 
be monitored in order to avoid detention.191 By having wealthy defendants, 
as part of their conditions for release, chip in money to a general probation 
fund means that the government can more easily take on the cost of 
electronic surveillance and avoid putting the burden on minority 
communities. And, if more individuals are overall released, as is the goal of 
this Note, then whatever money they government would have spent on 
defendants pretrial can go to funding their conditions or helpful programs, 
discussed more below. It does mitigate some of Professor Arnett’s concern 
about cost imposition but does nothing to lift the worry of stigmatization and 
entrenchment in marginalized groups. A security guard in this instance is no 
different than an ankle monitor, and home still won’t be home.192 But it 
allows a defendant to escape prison, potentially continue employment, and 
engage in more post-arrest rehabilitative measures that have been shown to 
play a role in sentencing.193 
There is also a concern that expanding the breadth of conditions imposed 
is unduly restrictive, and, being impossible to meet, essentially guarantee a 
 
186 Arnett, supra note 184, at 651. 
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defendant will be incarcerated pretrial for failing to meet the conditions. This 
is a major concern, but the requirement of “least restrictive” hopefully serves 
as a check on undue conditions. Conditions should only be imposed to the 
extent they are needed to check any potential finding that triggers a 
rebuttable presumption; anything more violates the Bail Reform Act and the 
spirit of this Note. 
Reading the Bail Reform Act practically means that courts need to focus 
on conditions authorizing release. Courts need to return to the 
defendant-specific approached championed by Sabhnani.194 Practically 
reading the Bail Reform Act for release for the wealthy, as this Section has 
argued, includes reading release for the indigent. A practical reading means 
refocusing on the language of the Bail Reform Act pointing towards release 
and utilizing it in a defendant-specific context; this applies regardless of the 
defendant’s wealth. 
C. A Societal Approach to Release 
“Least restrictive” can also be read to provide positive pathways for 
defendants to be rehabilitated, causing long-term positive changes for their 
lives going forward. Reading “least restrictive” in light of societal needs 
means that courts should focus not only on release but on rehabilitative 
conditions. If a court can consider the vast conditions that a wealthy 
individual could afford as part of setting bail, then a court should be able to 
consider rehabilitative factors available upon release for indigent 
defendants. This resolves the disparate pretrial treatment between wealthy 
and indigent defendants created by Boustani II. By advocating for 
generalized decarceration and allowing for more release, this allows 
defendants to take advantage of the rehabilitative conditions and programs 
available through pretrial services which “help[] defendants acquire and use 
prosocial life skills with a focus on cognitive and choice awareness, 
recognition of the motive and influence of others, problem solving and 
deductive reasoning.”195 Leveling up the meaning of “least restrictive” to a 
broad array of conditions positively impacts both groups of defendants, and 
society as a whole. 
While federal prisons do have rehabilitative programming, released 
defendants have greater access to community resources, as well as 
interactive programs such as Support Court, which is not open to 
incarcerated individuals. And the rehabilitative programs within the Bureau 
of Prisons are voluntary. Having program attendance be a condition of 
release requires  defendants to participate, which can provide them with 
 
194 One way to engage in this defendant specific analysis would be through risk assessment tools. 
However, this Note will not discuss risk assessment tools because recent articles have exposed how 
unreliable and discriminatory these tools can be. For examples of articles discussing risk assessment in 
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services that they would not have otherwise sought out for themselves. 
Viewing “least restrictive” in this light adds a new weight to the bail 
determination balance: an interest in rehabilitation. This again allows “least 
restrictive” to become quite expansive and encapsulate conditions other than 
those that go directly toward flight and danger prevention, to those that 
actually benefit the defendant. As part of setting conditions of release, a 
judge can have a defendant actively seek employment, continue or start an 
education program, get medical or psychiatric treatment, participate in 
inpatient or outpatient programs, or any other condition as the court and 
pretrial services see fit.196 And some positive conditions also simply are not 
available in prison. While defendants may be able to have a job in prison, 
they are likely not able to keep the job they had before being charged, 
whereas release allows that opportunity. Family access is also incomparable; 
family members may be able to visit a defendant in prison, but that is a far 
cry from what a familial relationship looks like in our society. Maintaining 
employment and family relationships are crucial for rehabilitating a 
defendant and preventing future crime.197  
 Arguing for wealthy defendants to be released based upon conditions 
they can afford then allows for a broader consideration of what conditions 
actually mitigate flight and danger across the board.198 This opens up more 
consideration for mitigating and rehabilitative conditions such as these and 
serves as a pathway for increased release. 
Mass incarceration is a massive problem in the United States, and pretrial 
detention is a large part of that. It is in society’s best interest to read the Bail 
Reform Act in this context and in light of each defendant’s role in society. 
This includes wealthy defendants; arguing for the release of wealthy 
defendants based upon the conditions they can afford can help further the 
overall societal interest in decarceration, which positively affects indigent 
defendants. Another incarcerated individual is a burden on the system, whether 
rich or poor. In this context, any release where the defendant does not pose 
more societal harm is beneficial; even releasing defendants to a private jail.  
When reading “least” restrictive in a societal manner, courts should 
incorporate the costs of incarceration when considering whether factors 
mitigate flight risk or danger to the defendant.199 Doing so adds further 
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context for considering whether certain conditions are indicated. This then 
raises the bar for what “least restrictive” means by incorporating advancing 
societally beneficial goals into its meaning. “Least restrictive,” just as the 
approaches above suggested, then expands to include those conditions that 
the judge finds would keep a defendant, of any means, out of jail. 
The costs of incarceration are notably high. Federal pretrial detention 
centers are overcrowded and understaffed, leading to “neglect and 
violence.”200 In 2019, there were roughly 51,000 individuals being 
monitored by the U.S. Marshals, the office responsible for monitoring 
pretrial detainees.201 Pretrial detainees are housed in detention centers, 
correctional centers, federal transfer centers, private prisons, and sometimes 
even local jails, 202 with the U.S. Marshall service renting around 26,200 jail 
cells to house pretrial detainees.203  
Incarceration has been linked to an increase in depression and an 
increased risk of self-harm and suicide in younger detainees.204 Detention is 
linked to wrongful convictions, longer sentences, and recidivism.205 Pretrial 
detention also “has a corrosive effect on defendants—separating them from 
their legal team, family, and other potentially prosocial connections in the 
community.”206 Incarceration, even pretrial, affects employment.207 It also 
leads to an increase in suspicion and aggression on the part of the 
defendant.208 Those who have been incarcerated face stigma after their 
release, and the poverty, unemployment, and social isolation resulting from 
incarceration lead to an increased risk of health problems.209 And these 
effects are disproportionally borne by “poor, uneducated people of color, 
about half of whom suffer from mental health problems.”210 Roughly 45% 
of federal prisoners suffer from mental illnesses,211 and 10–25% of prisoners 
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have serious mental illnesses including schizophrenia.212 Black defendants 
specifically are “more likely to be incarcerated before trial.”213 Incarceration 
also affects the families left behind, as they feel anger and shame, affecting 
intrapersonal relationships.214 Additionally, the children of incarcerated 
defendants have increased risks of poverty, mental health problems, and 
behavioral issues, which increase the likelihood that they will be 
incarcerated later on.215  
Because of “increased discretion and a lack of public scrutiny” 
associated with pretrial detention, “the potential of racial bias impacting this 
decision is increased.”216 While this is most keenly felt in the state systems, 
the federal system is not immune. As Professor Cynthia Jones has 
documented, even at the federal level, with objective statutory factors to 
consider, notable racial disparities in bail determinations exist.217 The 
documented study from the early 1990s notes that while “race did not 
significantly affect pretrial release outcomes,” white defendants received 
more benefit from stratification factors, such as education income, as 
opposed to Black defendants with comparable backgrounds.218 And, as 
noted previously, the racial disparities are more keenly seen today through 
the types of charges being brought and the impact those charges have on the 
statutory factors and the detention decision.219  
In this context, “least restrictive” then becomes almost a ceiling, 
meaning a judge can impose the conditions necessary to keep a defendant 
out of jail in light of the aforementioned problems, though limited by the 
considerations of over conditioning mentioned above. This then treats both 
wealthy and indigent defendants in the same manner and advocates for the 
release of both. The idea of the wealthy building a “private prison” then 
becomes less of a quandary if indigent defendants are also taken care of. The 
beauty of releasing wealthy defendants to these home prisons is that the 
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wealthy defendant pays for the conditions, reducing the cost on the 
government. An increase in wealthy at home detention would then mean 
more money for positive pretrial programs for indigent defendants. 
Sentencing mitigation programs are a new phenomenon, and “24 districts 
now have formal judge-involved intervention and treatment programs, with 
even more informal programs of various sizes.”220 One example is the 
District of Connecticut’s Support Court. The program brings together 
federal judges, the United States Attorney’s Office, the Federal Defender’s 
Office, and the Pretrial Services Office to support and aid defendants with 
substance abuse treatment at the pretrial and post-conviction stages.221 
Support Court works with defendants who have substance abuse problems 
to serve as a “comprehensive treatment program,”222 with goals such as 
having defendants: remain drug-free, be law-abiding, improve their 
employability and education, improve their social skills, enhance their 
self-esteem, learn relapse warnings signs and develop a relapse plan, 
improve their financial education and responsibility, cope with problems, 
and develop time management skills.223 Under a societal approach, the 
conditions for release for indigent defendants can become rehabilitative.  
Considering the societal impact and effect of incarceration is an 
important gloss that allows courts to read “least restrictive” in a manner that 
cuts against the idea of a “private prison” and instead allows for societal 
improvement through a decrease in government spending, a decrease in 
incarceration, and, hopefully, an increase in rehabilitative pretrial programs 
for indigent defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
“Freedom comes from human beings, rather than from laws and 
institutions.”224 While the Bail Reform Act provides the essential 
framework, it is ultimately within judicial (human) discretion to detain or 
release. It is imperative that considerations of wealth are not allowed to 
factor in a judge’s mind. As this Note sought to demonstrate, detaining 
wealthy individuals in order to prevent a “two-tiered bail system” is not the 
answer. Nor is releasing wealthy defendants at the expense of indigent 
defendants. Instead, the answer is to read “least restrictive” with the Bail 
Reform Act with an eye toward release. And in order to force this 
perspective, the lens must be shifted. Detaining everyone to avoid disparities 
does nothing for any party: defendant, prosecutor, judge, or civilian. 
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Releasing everyone leads to risks of flight, and in rare cases, recidivism. It 
is possible to find a balance. Boustani II’s holding does not solve inequitable 
treatment. It makes injustice equal. 
 
 
 
